The United States Department of Defence China Military Power Report 2024 has been released. The Report provides the US military perspective of China’s military capability development during the past one year serving as a useful benchmark for assessment.
As per the Pentagon senior defense official briefing conducted on December 16, 2024, some of the key takeaways indicate that the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] continuing to progress towards the goals of modernization envisaged in an increasingly complex strategic environment. Here are the extracts of the key developments summarized from the Transcript-
Firstly, China [PRC] is forging ahead with its long-standing national strategy while confronting what it views as an increasingly turbulent strategic environment. The PRC seeks to amass national power to achieve what Xi Jinping has referred to as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049 and to revise the international order in support of the PRC's system of governments and its national interests.
PLA modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of the PRC's broader aspirations for its national development, which involve heavily investing in technological self-sufficiency and an advanced manufacturing.
Secondly PLA continues to make steady progress in modernizing its conventional capabilities, but it also continues to struggle with long-standing deficiencies. In 2023, the PLA demonstrated key capabilities such as long range joint fires in major exercises such as the April 2023 Joint Sword exercise.
The PLA Air Force, with respect to its modernization and indigenization of its unmanned aerial systems, is quickly approaching US standards.
At the same time, through 2023 and again into 2024, PLA media have continued to highlight long standing problems in the PLA, and they especially highlight what they perceive as shortcomings with their commanders and personnel quality.
The PLA continues to highlight what they refer to as the five incapables, which is a PLA slogan asserting that some PLA commanders are incapable of judging situations, understanding higher authorities' intentions, making operational decisions, deploying forces or managing unexpected situations. And despite the PLA's rapid development, it has not yet demonstrated the type and sophistication of certain capabilities it would need in a major regional contingency. These include urban warfare and long distance logistics.
Thirdly, the PLA continues to struggle with deeply rooted problems of corruption. In the second half of 2023 alone, at least 15 high-ranking military officials and defense industry executives were removed from their posts for corruption. Several were responsible for overseeing equipment development projects related to modernizing China's ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles.
The most prominent of these cases was of course former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October 2023, but others included the former PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, as well as several deputy commanders.
And earlier this year, the PLA dissolved its Strategic Support Force after creating it in December 2015 to consolidate its space cyber electronic information and psychological warfare capabilities. This decision to dissolve the Strategic Support Force reveals compelling concerns that were sufficient to merit the dissolution of the force. This wave of corruption related investigations and the removal of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA's progress toward its 2027 goals.
Fourthly key takeaway is that the PLA continues its rapid nuclear build up DOD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid-2024 and we estimate the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.
The department also assesses the PRC will continue growing its nuclear force through at least 2035.
Fifthly the PRC continues to intensify its pressure against allies and partners such as the Philippines and Taiwan. Throughout 2023, the PRC escalated tensions with the Philippines in the South China Sea by ramming and boarding vessels en route to supply Second Thomas Shoal.
Finally China Russia ties remain strong. The PRC continues to support Russia with material assistance as well as by promoting Russian narratives, blaming the United States and NATO for its war with Ukraine.
The PRC's stated defense policy remains oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security and development interests, while emphasizing more of a greater global role for itself. This policy largely understates the PRC's objective of revising the international order in support of its interests, as well as its system of governance.
One key part of the PRC defense policy is its counter intervention approach, which aims to be prepared to counter the US in the East and South China Sea, as well as in the broader Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the PRC is strengthening its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean and beyond.
With respect to Xi Jinping's most near-term capability milestone for the PLA, she continued to reaffirm his commitment to the PLA's 2027 milestone for modernization, which if realized could give the PLA the capacity to be a more credible military tool for the Chinese Communist Party's Taiwan unification efforts.
On PLA capabilities, the PRC has continued the development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen its ability to, as they would put it, to fight and win wars against a strong enemy.
PLA services are making steady and incremental progress toward their respective modernization goals.
The PLA Army, for example, has demonstrated long range fires capabilities.
The PLA Navy has conducted new operations beyond the first island chain.
The PLA Air Force absorbed significant portions of PLA Naval Aviation.
And the PLA Rocket Force continued to develop new missiles, including ICBMs, potentially including conventionally armed systems.
Before dissolving the Strategic Support Force in April 2024, the SSF's components continued to rapidly mature the PRC's space enterprise, and of course that work has continued after the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force.
The PRC has continued developing counterspace capabilities that can contest or deny other nations access to and operations in the space domain. These include direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare and directed energy systems.
The PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, or JLSF, has also continued improving joint strategic and campaign level logistics and trying to become more efficient by integrating civilian products and services. And this often focuses on facilitating the movement of PLA forces for equipment and training. The JLSF will probably play a similar traffic routing role in a mobilization or wartime scenario.
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