India’s biggest defence and security challenge is the lethargic pace of capability and capacity building which is handing over a critical advantage to the country’s adversaries China and Pakistan. While the two front collusive axes has long been recognized as a quasi existential threat to India, recent upgradation of mutual capabilities providing an advantage now to even Pakistan at least in numbers in terms of combat fighters has shaken up the Indian defence bureaucracy.
A committee to examine acceleration of the process of acquisition of combat fighters has been formed under the Defnece Secretary – who is as be Rules of Business of the Government of India – responsible for the Defence of the country.
Will this Committee come to a decision which can increase the pace of combat fighter induction remains to be seen, unless the selection has been made and the objective is to provide a veneer of official approval to the same. For such is the opacity of India’s defence procurement process that it is very difficult to decipher the pathway intended.
More importantly, the acquisition of a combat fighter has been delayed for 23 years after the Indian Air Force (IAF) had first projected the requirement of 126 aircraft in the Medium Multi Role category, a testimony of the labyrinthine decision making process.
In fact in a decent time frame, in January 2012, the Rafale – from the French Dassault Aviation stable had been down selected but the commercial negotiations floundered over multiple issues including the liability clause amidst integration of IAF desired weapon systems, offset partners and so on.
Finally, a government-to-government agreement for acquisition of 36 Rafale was signed in 2015, which has been inducted in the Air Force now. In fact, possibly many more Rafale would have been inducted in the IAF had the decision making not floundered due to short sightedness of the negotiations committee.
The case of the MMRCA of the Air Force is not unique. The Indian Navy has been similarly struggling to acquire six submarines under what is known as the 75 (I) programme first conceived in late 1990’s.
Today almost three decades later and after multiple iterations the selection of the final sub rests on demonstrations by foreign partners of L&T Shipbuilding and Mazagaon Dock Shipbuilders – Navantia of Spain and TKMS of Germany respectively.
Of the two models the one by Navantia is not fully operational but continues to be in the race indicating the prevarication in decision making for reasons best known to the mandarins in power in the South Block – HQs of the Ministry of Defence. This malaise is not exclusive to the MOD but other ministries are similarly impacted which is indicated by the limited number of Free Trade Agreements inked by India bilateral and hesitation in joining multilateral ones as the RCEP.
The delays can be summarized to one single factor – a quest for acquiring the best at the cheapest price to be manufacturing at home.
The Best thus is the enemy of the good.
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