On October 21, India's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Vivek Mishri, announced that India and China have resolved their differences regarding the disengagement from two remaining points of contention on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. Over the past four weeks, the decision on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, at Depsang and Demchok, has been successfully implemented. This had defied resolution for the past two years.
Given the political and military significance of these positions, it was to be expected that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Western Theatre Command would be reluctant to abandon the advantage of restricting front line access to the Indian Army to the Line of LAC in these sectors.
The disengagement is a positive development, as adversarial positions in a face-off between troops can potentially lead to an escalation. Nevertheless, it seems that the objective of the negotiations was merely to separate the troops and prevent another confrontation, as was the case in Galwan 2020. Therefore, any expectation beyond this may be optimistic.
Furthermore, apart from the actions on the ground, there is limited information available regarding negotiations that preceded the resolution. These negotiations were conducted in secrecy, with no joint statements or clarity on the concessions made by either side.
The Chinese have been markedly more opaque than India, which reflects the contrasting approaches to public information adopted by both sides. In the absence of verifiable data regarding prospective developments, several assumptions can be posited as follows.
The configuration of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh has become a source of considerable complexity. In addition to the existing discrepancies in perception, the issue of buffer zones and patrolling points has emerged as a further point of contention. Such an approach will inevitably complicate the management and resolution of the border dispute. To illustrate, in Depsang and Demchok, managed patrolling is the adopted practice, whereas adjacent areas are characterised by the presence of buffer zones.
The PLA continued to occupy the vital area of the Depsang Plains, thereby enabling concentration of forces opposite Daulat Beg Oldi – Advanced Landing Ground and the Base for any operation towards the Karakoram Pass. It seems unlikely that this will change in the near future.
The construction of a road by China through Sakhsgam Valley to the Karakoram Pass may further dissuade any scope for Indian adventurism towards the vital ground though there are no known designs in this regard. While Siachen may be geographically threatened, the scope for any operations by the PLA in the medium term remains improbable.
In conclusion, the current state of conflict is one of suspension of aggressive intent. The subsequent phase will be one of de-escalation, which will be monitored with great interest.
These developments have not been underpinned by an agreement thus far, with four existing ones now defunct following China's misadventure in 2020. It seems unlikely that an agreement will be reached, as both parties appear to favour an ambiguous approach to provide wriggle room in the future, which though dangerous is a factual reality now.
Upon the successful conclusion of de-escalation, it is possible that Special Representatives of India and China may engage in discussions aimed at resolving the boundary and territorial dispute. Given the annual frequency of such meetings, it is likely that the issue will remain unresolved for an extended period.
Furthermore, resolution of the issues has become exceedingly complex, necessitating a compromise that is not perceived as essential by Beijing and New Delhi. The prevailing view is to bide time and await an opportune moment for a resolution to emerge. It is not possible to make any accurate prediction of the same in the medium term until there is any change in the power equation. Furthermore, it would be unwise to speculate about the long term at this stage.
In light of the considerable military build-up on both sides and the infrastructure upgrades undertaken by India in recent years, which are comparable to those of China in terms of facilitating mobilisation, the possibility of a resolution through military force is highly unlikely.
Therefore, the India-China border has become another frontier that has been frozen, with the potential for sporadic flashpoints to emerge. Therefore, the likelihood of renewed conflict remains high, contingent upon peace and stability until such time as political concord, diplomatic obligations and economic necessity prevail.
This does not bode well for the security landscape in Asia, where the two largest resident political and military powers are engaged in a, “frozen conflict”. It creates an opportunity for geopolitical spoilers with their own interests to influence India, particularly in a long-term contest with China. Beijing is also culpable for pursuing an exclusive foreign policy in the Indian subcontinent, maintaining lack of transparency regarding its activities in the Indian Ocean region, and engaging in aggressive actions against smaller nations in the South China Sea and beyond.
For the Indian Armed Forces, despite the disengagement and possible de-escalation, maintaining a high state of readiness on the China front [as well as Pakistan] remains a default option, regardless of the political and diplomatic developments.
This is a lesson that the Indian military tends to overlook, as evidenced by events in 1972, Sino-Indian War, 1986-87, and Eastern Ladakh in 2020. Regardless of the prevailing political climate, the operational readiness of the military must remain a paramount concern.
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