In a lecture at a lecture at the India International Centre [IIC] on ‘Future Wars and the Indian Armed Forces’. India’s Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan, the senior most military commander stated that the issue of borders between India and China was a cartographic misperception that is due to differing understanding of maps and “we cannot really say which is correct and which is wrong”. “On the question that since 1947, India finds its map shrinking and shrinking (with respect to China), if we were on the other side… if we were China in 1950 and had a look at their map they would also have found that their map is shrinking, partly because of us… they claim the state of Arunachal Pradesh. This dispute goes on, we can’t really say which is correct and which is wrong,” Chauhan stated in response to a question on the current situation along the LAC and how India’s map had been shrinking since 1947 with respect to China.
If the India China border dispute is merely due to cartographic misperception than there would have been a resolution long back despite the antagonistic approach to negotiations which have been progressing in spurts and have been disrupted with long interludes the latest one being from April 2020 to October 2024 – with de-escalation from the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh awaited.
From the Indian perspective dumbing down the dispute to that of differing interpretation of maps violates a resolution of the parliament. The Indian parliament “unanimously adopted a resolution on February 22, 1994, emphasizing that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India”, in context of Pakistan. The operative sentence reads, “The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means…”
This resolution equally applies to China and its occupation of Aksai Chin. This is the basic framework of the boundary and the ultimate aim howsoever long it may take or seem unachievable is vacation of the areas under Chinese occupation.
China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh in the same vein has no locus standi despite the constant informational sniping.
In case of any negotiation in which a barter of territory takes place in the future, this will need the approval of the Parliament and cannot be an Executive decision.
China’s strategic approach towards disputed land or maritime borders has been to adopt ambiguous resolutions or codes. This is evident in the South China Sea dispute with numerous South East Asian States where a discussion on Code of Conduct is ongoing. China is unwilling to be bound by a rigid framework.
This is reflected in the boundary dispute with India as well as Bhutan the two neighbours with which resolution is pending. The present configuration of the LAC in Eastern Ladakh fits in with this Chinese approach with multiple patrolling points, buffer zones and held areas, the hybrid nature increases the difficulty in surveillance and identification of intrusions.
This ambiguity will increase over the years when units turn around and commanders change far more frequently on the Indian side than the Chinese. This should be factored in the SOP on handing taking over so that there is clear understanding on the current situation as a temporary line to avoid escalation rather than a permanent boundary.
This is not an argument for resetting of bilateral relations between India and China in multiple spheres from the defence to diplomacy, economic and people to people which is welcome but with the parameters of understanding of territorial sovereignty as strictly defined by the Parliament.
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