With two major wars Ukraine and Israel-Iran-Lebanon-Gaza ongoing in the world – an exceptional occurrence since the Second World War when multiple theatres from Europe to North Africa, Middle East, Pacific and South East Asia were engulfed in flames of fire, the tools of principal warfighting remain the same – fighter aircraft, tanks and artillery guns operating under the shield of air defence all supporting the ‘poor bloody infantry’ on the ground.
Yes, these are far more advanced weapons platforms than that fielded in the Second World War or even during the recent Gulf War 1991 or Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 in terms of lethality and precision, yet the centrality of these instruments is underlined against the backdrop of emergence of drones – uncrewed platforms and missiles – both ballistic and cruise.
There was a general euphoria over emergence of the drone after the Azerbaijan Armenia war known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: 2020 in which Baku subjugated Yerevan with use of uncrewed machines supplied by Turkey. This can now be viewed as largely due to lack of corresponding air and drone defence measures and a general unpreparedness on the part of the underdog – Armenia.
Today in the large canvas of wars in Ukraine and the Middle East no doubt drones and missiles are playing an important role, yet they are not decisive to turn the tide and in some ways are symbolic weapons employed for strategic purposes. This is evident from the thousands of missiles and drones that have been launched by Russia so far and also replicated by Ukraine at least in terms of drones. In the Middle East, Iran and its proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthi did not anticipated that their hundreds of rockets missiles and drones cannot bring down Jerusalem which having anticipated the superior number of these raining down on the country created a virtually impenetrable air and missile defence system – the Iron Dome being the symbol.
Israel had to launch conventional ground operations supported by air to achieve the war objectives of decimation of the Hamas and the Hezbollah now. While the outcome of the war will continues to remain elusive for the Israel Defence Forces it was the battles on the front line in Gaza and Southern Lebanon which has won it a degree of superiority over its adversaries.
The absence of an opportunity for a turning movement has resulted in heavy assaults by the infantry which has seen Russian forces advance almost inch by inch in the present front of the War in Donbas, in Eastern Ukraine.
This is a replication of battles in the past two years and eight months now be it offensive by Russia or counter offensive by Ukraine.
The Kursk maneouvre by Ukraine restored mobility in the battlefield for the first time in the War which has been one of attrition so far.
While drones have been used for multiple purposes from the First Person View or FPV to glide bombs these have been addendums underlining the necessity for investing in hard combat power – armour, mechanised infantry, foot soldiers, artillery and combat engineering.
The layered air and missile defence systems used by Ukraine have succeeded in destroying large number of drones and missiles though many did penetrate and caused casualties mainly to civilians when employed away from the battlefront by Russia.
Israel’s war in Gaza and the ongoing frontal attacks in Lebanon also underline the same lessons. While drones and missiles have been used it is the strike aircraft, tanks and guns which have been effective apart from air and missile defence systems such as the Arrow, David’s Sling and Iron Dome used in a layered manner which have produced the desired outcomes.
Iran which has launched at least two large missile and drone barrage on Israel – named as Operation True Promise I and II has not been able to penetrate the defences and failed to cause major casualties in Israel as it was hoped. But the missile and drone barrages have proved to be symbolic for Tehran to demonstrate that it would retaliate when spurred on by Israeli aggression.
For conventional militaries facing the challenge from well-armed adversaries as India, investment in hard power tools is important as war outcomes will continue to be decided by fighters, tanks and guns with the infantry in tow and an air defence umbrella.
On the wider civil wars such as that ongoing in Myanmar however, it is the soldiers fighting on the ground alone that will make the difference.
Yes, missiles and drones are valuable but, in such battles, even tanks, guns and fighters are not adequate to retain and regain territory as the Myanmar Army has now realised.
Today technology is the buzzword. Artificial Intelligence [AI] is seen as a magical tool that will see the invisible enemy on the battlefield, select the shooter, neutralise him and display the damage caused on the screen of the commander. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yes AI has simplified many of these functions which were earlier human and increasing the efficiency and pace at which the enemy can be engaged, the ultimate decision will remain human.
Moreover, technology by itself is not a war winning factor. The force with the best technology will not necessarily win, but a combination of mass, manpower and morale is essential for battlefield success.
Learning to exploit technology rather than being a slave to it will win wars. Investing in people through training and skill building for warfighting is the essence of success thus focus on the basics and make technology slave to the war fighter.
Opmerkingen