Developed jointly by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), select Indian Navy (IN) personnel and Russian scientists and technicians, the commissioning of the 6,000 tonne and 112m long Arighat (Destroyer of the enemy) was delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic that erupted two years later alongside assorted technical issues.
However, Russia’s involvement in the programme in designing the SSBNs and miniaturising their reactors has long been an open, though downplayed secret amongst naval, atomic and strategic community personnel. But Arihant’s launch ceremony in July 2009 was the first time it was publicly acknowledged through the presence of the Russian naval design team and their country’s then ambassador V I Trubnikov. Such sensitive co-operation is also one of the underpinnings of the enduring strategic and military co-operation between Moscow and New Delhi, that was reiterated during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Russia.
Thereafter, Arihant-also constructed at the SCB- was quietly commissioned in August 2016 and completed its 20-day maiden deterrence patrol over two years later in November 2018. Delayed by some 15-18 years, Arihant was scheduled to conduct its first deterrence patrol in 2017, but was reportedly damaged early that year after its propulsion compartment was flooded while in Visakhapatnam harbour. At the time the Hindu newspaper had reported in January 2018 that water had rushed into the boat 10 months earlier, after a hatch at the rear of the platform was left open, a claim that was never officially confirmed nor denied.
Industry and naval sources said Arihant’s on-board systems had ‘broadly’ been duplicated in Arighat and the S4, which was launched in 2021 and awaits formal naming.
Exact details of Arihant’s-and Arighat’s- powerplant are unclear, but it is understood to be propelled by an 82.5 MW pressurised light water reactor (LWR), turning a single seven-bladed screw to achieve submerged sprint underwater speed of 24 kt, or about 10 kt on the surface. The two SSBNs principal strategic weapons load comprises 12 K-15/B-05 indigenously developed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fired from four vertical-launch tubes, each carrying a 5-tonne nuclear payload out to a range of 750km. The S4, on the other hand will eventually be better armed as development of the DRDO-designed K-4 SLBM with a 4,000km range would have been completed by the time it was ready for commissioning. It is expected to carry carry eight K-4 SLBM’s, or alternately 24 K-15 SLBMs with respective strike ranges of 3,500km and 750km respectively.
Also involved in the SSBN programme is private defence contractor Larsen & Toubro (L&T), tasked with constructing their hulls at its Hazira facility in Gujarat and building the vertical launcher to test the K-15 SLBM. L&T also installed Arihant’ s and Arighat’s three 533 mm torpedo tubes believed to fire Russian TEST-71ME-NK variants.
Other private companies, such as Walchandnagar Industries, provided Arihant’ s gearbox and shafting, while Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division in collaboration with UK’s BAE Systems designed a platform management system and electronic warfare consoles for the combat management system (CMS). The state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited supplied Arihant’ s and Arighat’s two sonar systems – USHUS and Panchendriya – designed by the DRDO’s Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory. Panchendriya is understood to incorporate surveillance, passive, intercept, and active features, in addition to doubling as an underwater communication system.
BEL also developed both SSBNs CMS, while a handful of Israeli and French companies provided an assortment of radar, sensors, communication equipment, and anti-torpedo countermeasures among other systems and sub-assemblies. Numerous domestic Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises too were part of the SSBNs supply chain, acquiring in the process expertise in welding submarine hull sections capable of withstanding immense pressure at significant depths. They also supplied a host of pipes, pumps, cables, compressors, air-conditioning equipment, and generators, in support of the navy’s wider indigenisation endeavours.
Built with Russian steel broadly equivalent to the US HY-80 grade, Arihant and Arighat were divided into seven compartments, with main divisions for the propulsion system – acoustically damped and sealed into a 600-tonne titanium shell circa 10 m in diameter – the CMS, platform management centre, and torpedo room. It also features a double hull, sandwiching ballast tanks. Two stand-by auxiliary engines and a retractable thruster provide the SSBN with emergency power and mobility to meet operational eventualities.
The SSBN programme will eventually be supplemented by the separate indigenous production- also at the SCB- of 4-6 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for the IN, which were first approved by the federal government in early 2015. Official sources had indicated that the Cabinet Committee on Security, headed by the PM, is expected to sanction around Rs 50,000 cores to build three of these 6,000-tonne SSN’s, with the first boat scheduled for completion by 2032-33.
Financial sanction for the remaining three SSN’s, that were expected to incorporate over 95 per cent of locally sourced content, would ‘follow subsequently’ once the programme progressed. The entire SSN programme would span a 25-year period from when the first boats construction started, it added..
The IN’s 1999 submarine building programme-delayed by almost a decade-had envisaged a force of 24 ‘hunter-killer’ diesel-electric conventional submarines (SSKs) with air independent propulsion and land-attack capability, which were scheduled to have joined service by 2029-30. But delays in inducting the SSKs and an emerging unstable regional maritime security environment, had prompted the IN to recently opt for six SSNs instead to provide it greater operational flexibility.
A cross-section of IN officers said that in its quest to become a Blue Water force, it’s imperative for the navy to acquire SSN capability if it wanted to shape the maritime battlespace in the increasingly restive Indian Ocean Region. Hence, its only SSBN’s and SSNs that can constitute the cutting edge of the INs offensive capability, either by themselves or as part an aircraft carrier battle group.
These officers also said that the SSN programme would ‘harness’ the know-how and technologies gained from the SSBN project, but questioned the inexplicable lack of expertise in domestically building conventional submarines, for which foreign original equipment manufacturer assistance still remained imperative.
Commentaires